ABSTRACT: This study explores the role of media in securing the electorate success of Ataka, Bulgaria's ultra-right-wing party, as well as their contribution to the rise of nationalistic tendencies among the Bulgarian electorate. To accomplish this, the study sets two goals: first, to explore the political and socio-cultural environment which has allowed for the growth of ultra-nationalist rhetoric in Bulgaria, and second, to examine how Ataka's media publicity machine, with a specific focus on their new media tactics, have contributed to securing popular support for the virtually unfettered expression of ultra-nationalistic ideas. By conducting a critical analysis of Ataka's use of electronic media, including websites, online forums, and other social networking tools, the study analyzes the importance of electronic media to a right wing party such as Ataka, that catapulted it from complete obscurity into a political force of national importance.

KEYWORDS: media, nationalism, populism, xenophobic rhetoric

INTRODUCTION

Since the collapse of the totalitarian regimes in Southeastern Europe and certainly, dating back to the Ottoman Empire, the Balkan region has been synonymous with nationalism and ethnic strife. So much so, that the term “balkanization” has become a routine expression in political lingo to describe any process of fragmentation and break up at the national, international or institutional level. Nationalism, whether civic, ethnic or cultural, has defined to a great extent the nature of the political process of a nation inhabiting the Balkan Peninsula. Among those, Bulgaria has often been described as a model of ethnic tolerance, where groups of different ethnic backgrounds co-exist and co-share power without political turbulence and violent struggles.

In the last few years, however, the Bulgarian model of ethnic tolerance has come under threat by the powerful insurgence and formidable media presence of ultra-nationalist right wing political formations, which have quickly grown into full-blown political parties. The ultimate manifestation of these trends is the rise
to power of forces such as Ataka (Attack), led by right-winger Volen Siderov, who not only managed to win enough parliamentary seats to offset the already fragile political balance in the 2005 elections, but eventually gained strong support among many patriotic Bulgarians to emerge as the only contender against the incumbent Bulgarian president in the 2006 presidential elections. Ataka's political rise continued during the European Parliamentary Elections, when the party was able to secure three seats for their candidates. Among many political analysts and media critics, Ataka's rise to power was directly linked, if not entirely attributed to, the unfaltering support it received by the cable operator Skat and their TV station, bearing the same name. While speculations about who exactly financed Ataka's political campaign are still rampant, it is hard to deny that Ataka's unfettered access to an already disfranchised TV audience, and the onslaught of other media electronic campaign efforts were undeniably a critical factor in securing Ataka's and Siderov's successful rise to the top of the political arena.

Although Ataka has recently suffered a series of internal squabbles and scandals that have shaken the stability of the party, it still remains somewhat of a model of how media engineering can promote ultra-nationalistic platforms. The purpose of this paper is to trace the role of electronic media in securing the success of Ataka, as well as their contribution to the rise of ultra-nationalist tendencies among the Bulgarian electorate, which has found a particularly powerful manifestation in the new digital platforms of the Internet and the proliferation of other far-right political formations, such as the Bulgarian National Union, which has followed in its political inception the footsteps of Ataka. To accomplish this, the study sets two goals: first, to explore the political and socio-cultural environment which has allowed for the growth of ultra-nationalist rhetoric in Bulgaria, and second, to examine how Ataka’s media publicity machine, with a specific focus on their new media tactics, have contributed to securing popular support for the virtually unfettered, and unsanctioned, expression of ultra-nationalistic ideas. By conducting an in-depth analysis of Ataka’s use of electronic media as well as that of other similar far-right political formations and their websites, online forums, and other social networking tools, the study examines the importance of electronic media to a right-wing party such as Ataka that catapulted it from complete obscurity into a political force of national importance.

MEDIA AND NATIONALISM

The role of mass media in the formation of national identity was clearly established by Anderson (1983) when he defined nations as “imagined communities.” To quote him directly:

I propose the following definition of the nation: it is an imagined political community — and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign. It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the images of their communion. (p. 15)
Anderson (1983) went as far as identifying the “technology or communications,” or print in particular, as one of three distinctive paths to imagined communities (p. 46). He contended that national consciousness emerged as a result of “print capitalism” since the newspaper “implies the refraction of ‘world events’ into a specific imagined world of vernacular readers” (p. 63). It is in the ritual of simultaneous ritual consumption, where spatial and temporal experiences of nationhood happen (Anderson, 1983). But as Demertzis, Papanthanosopoulos and Armenakis (1999, p. 28) pointed out, “this does not mean that old and contemporary nationalisms are caused by the media of communication, but the media have been one of the structural prerequisites that facilitated their genesis and spread.”

Indeed, the idea of nations as imagined political communities suggests that national consciousness is primarily a mediated consciousness and that mass media, not just newspapers, can play a role in the way members of a community understand the nation or experience their national identity. In this vein, Law (2001, p. 301) pointed out that “national identity is not directly reducible to either state or civil society. Rather, it mediates them semiotically, hence the significance of mass communications for the national idea”.

Therefore, it becomes quite clear that the media, as Erajavec and Volcic (2006, p. 305) argued, “are clearly not neutral agents.” The media hold a particularly important place in defining the political and social power structure, but even more so, they play a crucial role in articulating and interpreting the meaning of news events and matters of national importance. In other words, the media do not passively describe or record news events but actively reconstruct them, mostly based on their own ideological affiliations. As Volcic (2005) put it:

Members of the (national) media audience are variously invited to construct a sense of who “we” as nationals are, and who “we” are not. As such, media ideology can be understood as the “glue” of the social world, binding people to the concrete practices of daily life that reproduce a shared sense of national identity. (p. 288)

Such an approach evokes notions of media as ideological apparatuses. As the prominent cultural theorist Stuart Hall (1988, p. 118) argued, the mass media are a “major cultural and ideological force standing in a dominant position with respect to the way in which social relations and political problems are defined and the production and transformation of popular ideologies in the audience addressed.” More importantly, as Volcic (2005, p. 288) contended, “among other types of ideological labor, the media construct for us a definition of what nationalism is, what meaning the imagery of nationalism carries, and what the problem of nationalism is understood to be.” In this sense, media discourse can be viewed as directly related to expression of power relations in society. Consequently, it is natural to expect that those members of society who seek entrance in the structure of political power will resort to the media for generating and maintaining discourses that will help them build a political platform and place them firmly within the sphere of politics.
becomes particularly important to recognize when the political platform sought is founded on an ideology of ethno-nationalism and when the media discourse adopted for the purpose of expressing such ideology is laced with nationalistic rhetoric, made easily accessible through the channels of new media and digital content.

TREATMENT OF MINORITIES IN BULGARIA

Bulgaria incorporates various ethnic and religious minorities, including Jews, Macedonians, Russians, Walachians, Ukrainians, Greeks, and the largest minority, Muslims. The largest Muslim minority includes representatives of groups such as Roma, Turks (with the exception of Christian Turks), Tatars, Circassians, as well as Bulgarian Muslims, referred as Pomaks (a term which carries a relatively negative connotation, meaning “traitor”). As a result of its ethnic diversity, it is no surprise that the issue of national identity has come to dominate defining Bulgarian nationhood for centuries.

In the more recent history of Bulgaria, the 1944 communist rule instituted a new model of nation-building imported from the Soviet Union, ignoring the peculiarities of ethnic and religious identities. Religion, considered by Marx to be the “opium for the masses” was banned and religious identities were soon eradicated and obliterated in the interest of atheism. In Bulgaria, the ruling Communist Party (BCP) believed that a socialist consciousness could be fostered among religious ethnic minorities by promoting secularism, modernization and improved lifestyles. According to the BCP, Muslim consciousness and heritages of the Ottoman past were obstacles on the way to socialist progress and formation of a socialist consciousness (Neuburger, 2004). From the late 1950s, the Party attempted to weaken the Turkish national identity, and by the 1980s, pursued a policy of assimilation in an effort to eliminate it completely (Hopken, 1997). In this assimilation effort, the BCP encouraged a secularization of Turks and Muslims at the expense of curtailing their religious rights. In fact, as Zhelyaskova (2001) pointed out, in the 1960s, a total assimilation campaign was launched against Bulgarian and Turkish Muslims, which according to the party line, were forcefully “Islamized” and “Turkified” during the Ottoman period, and were now willing to restore their true Bulgarian identity (Ragaru, 2001).

This assimilatory policy culminated in the instituted name change for all Pomaks in 1972–1974, and for all Turks in 1984–1985. The latter effort known as the “Rebirth Process” led to the most intense confrontation between Muslims and Christians in Bulgaria and was met with a campaign of vocal resistance in 1989 by Bulgarian Turks and other dissident human rights organizations, demanding the right to restore their authentic Muslim names. Consequently, the leader of the BCP, Todor Zhivkov, announced on radio and public television, the opening of the border with Turkey and granted the right to “those who did not feel Bulgarian” to leave the country. Zhivkov maintained “there are no Turks in Bulgaria” and that the protests...
were instigated by Turkish “circles [that] harbored hope that they could turn the wheel of history back, to the times of the Ottoman Empire” (RFE/RL, June 1989). This period was ironically called by the government “the Grand Excursion” and was characterized as the largest movement of people since the Second World War — 350,000 ethnic Turks left the country, the majority of whom forcefully, leaving behind their homes and their possessions (Helsinki Watch Report, 1989, p. 1).

Following the collapse of the communist system in 1989, Bulgaria witnessed a dynamic change in inter-ethnic relations, impacted both by a long history of ethnic tension and even more so, by the economic and political uncertainties of the transitional period. The country was experiencing an escalation of ethnic tensions; however, full blown ethnic conflict was avoided in large part because of the engagement of pluralistic policies, integration of the Muslim minorities in the political structure, culminating in the establishment of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms1 (essentially, a political party of the Bulgarian ethnic Turks) and through negotiation and compromise (Vassilev, 2001; Warhola & Boteva, 2003). However, it is important to note that this relative victory for the so-called “ethnic tolerance model” in Bulgaria was not entirely free of nationalistic polemics and ethno-nationalistic political discourse — both the socialist and democratic forces, the two main competitors for political power in the early years of democratic transition, engaged in xenophobic rhetoric, becoming “a standard act in Bulgarian politics, shifting with the political wind through the years as a part in the electoral platforms of broad-based parties” (Volgyi, 2007, p. 37). Although some have argued that ethno-national rhetoric did not materialize, and was only utilized as a defensive mechanism in times of political uncertainty (Creed, 1990), others have argued that the Balkan region, including Bulgaria, is flooded with “successive waves of popular ethno-nationalism” (Smith, 2000, p. 10). As Petkov (2006, p. 110) points out, “the growing ethnicization of public life inevitably penetrated politics after which the issue of nation and civil rights is substituted by that of ethnic groups and their representation in power.”

ATAKA: THE TRANSITION’S PROBLEM CHILD

Ataka’s rise to the political arena in Bulgaria was secured by its unexpected 8% of votes in the parliamentary elections of 2005, which also secured it the position of the first nationalist party to enter Parliament since Bulgaria embarked on its road to democracy in 1989. Ataka’s 21 seats in a 240-seat parliament meant that the rest of the political parties had to at least acknowledge a movement that got 300,000 ballots (Alexandrova, 2005). While the other parliamentary groups denounced any future

---

1 As Vasilev (2001, p. 37) pointed out, although the MRF is not officially registered as an ethnic minority party, “virtually everyone in Bulgaria is aware of and recognizes its status as an ethnic minority party comprising over 100,000 ethnic Turks and just 3,000 ethnic Bulgarians (most of them Muslim Bulgarians or Pomaks).”
cooperation with the coalition, its leader proclaimed that Bulgarians who voted for Ataka saw in them a defender of their patriotic positions (Alexandrova, 2005).

Interestingly, even though Ataka was formed only two months prior to the elections (Brown, 2005), its leader, Volen Siderov, had an extensive career as a public figure, most of which he earned as a journalist and public commentator. Siderov worked as a photographer for the National Literature Museum during communism, but the events of 1989 propelled him to the position of editor-in-chief of the now defunct paper of the Union of Democratic Forces Demokratsia (Democracy) in 1990 (Brown, 2005). Siderov’s involvement with Demokratsia, however, was short-lived. He was fired in 1992, only to become a press attaché for a private electricity company and then the deputy editor-in-chief of the conservative private paper Monitor (Tavanier, 2005). When Siderov was dismissed from Monitor in 2003, he became the host of a TV talk show called Ataka (Attack) on the obscure cable channel Skat (Ditchev, 2006). In a general climate of no major media regulations and oversight of broadcast licenses, Siderov snatched the opportunity to create a media niche on Skat, indulging in his personal flair for inflammatory rhetoric, masquerading as the brave journey of an investigative journalist against a corrupt political class. Siderov’s provocative discussion of political and economic hardship, which he blamed on ethnic minorities and general lack of patriotism among the Bulgarian political class, resonated with disgruntled viewers and quickly propelled him to national prominence. As Sommerbauer (2007, p. 2) pointed out, “Siderov is a political chameleon: firstly a supporter of the reform movement ‘Unification of Democratic Forces,’ he sympathized later with Simeon, a former tsar returning from Spanish exile. In the last year he developed a radical — nationalist political position for the first time in his life.” In 2002, Siderov published a book, The Boomerang of Evil, that Human Rights Without Frontiers International called xenophobic and anti-Semitic (Tavanier, 2005), adding to Siderov’s line of politically crafted attacks against what he considered the primary targets of the political discontent of the oppressed Bulgarian electorate. To add further credibility to his utmost devotion to Bulgarian culture and historical past, in 2009, just a few days before the Parliamentary elections, Siderov earned a degree in theology after a 7-year stint as a student of the Orthodox Christian religion, asserting his position not only as an authority on the political front, but also a source of knowledge in matters of Bulgarian religion, culture and history.

Siderov’s rise to prominence during the 2005 preliminary elections was also a result of quick and clever political maneuvering. The nationalist coalition that he registered in April of 2005 carried the name of his talk show and included the National Movement for Homeland Rescue, the Bulgarian National-Patriotic Party, Attack political party, the Zora political circle, the Patriotic Forces and Military Reserves Union (On the “Attack”, 2005). The coalition campaigned with the simple slogan of “Bulgaria for Bulgarians” and the claim that ethnic minorities were too privileged and that the government was too corrupt (Tavanier, 2005). Ultimately, Siderov became the head of the 21-member coalition, which has since been shaken
by a series of internal conflicts and frictions caused in part by Siderov’s leadership style, leading to the dwindling of the members of the group down to fourteen. However, in the 2009 elections, Ataka was able to regain its 21 seats in the new parliament (only three members of the parliamentary group are female) and more importantly, since the election, has been one of the strongest allies of the government at the time headed by the Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB), another populist party, led by an equally charismatic leader in the face of former Zhivkov’s personal bodyguard, the mayor of Sofia, and current Prime Minister Boyko Borrisov (also known as the General). GERB, similar to Ataka, yet in a much more carefully measured tone of ethnic tolerance, bases its national identity on a heightened degree of Bulgarian patriotism. However, as Pencheva (2009) noted, the two populist parties differed a great deal in the style of leadership Siderov and Borrisov espoused, often reflected in their engagement and interaction with the media. As a result of their moderate approach to engaging the ethnic and religious minorities in Bulgaria, GERB has on several occasions not only initiated collaborative actions with the MRF, but also agreed to include the MRF in the ruling coalition — a political strategy which Siderov strongly condemned. This essentially signalled the beginning of the ideological rift between the two populist camps. It should also be noted that Ataka and GERB were among the dominant political bodies able to win a majority of votes during the elections for the European Parliament, with GERB practically winning the elections with five seats (Ghodshee, 2007). In the case of Ataka, the party secured three seats in the 2007 European Parliament and two seats in the 2009 European Parliament, winning 14.2% and 12% of the popular vote, respectively, positioning Ataka in fourth place in the European Parliament elections.

ATAKA’S MEDIA STRATEGIES: BEYOND CONVENTIONAL THINKING

While the surprising success of Ataka cannot be attributed solely to its access to media outlets, it is imperative to recognize the importance of its ability to control and manipulate its own media, and to do so, virtually free of the oversight of media regulatory bodies, whose sole responsibility is to monitor and sanction hate speech meant to incite ethnic or religious intolerance. Ataka’s media outlets, both print, internet-based and broadcast, became vital ideological vessels and a propaganda mouthpiece of the party in its struggle to promote a new “symbolic reality” that thrives upon economic uncertainty and political instability. As Sommerbauer (2007, p. 5) quoted Orlin Spassov, Bulgarian media expert and analyst, “for both Ataka and SKAT there is no difference between media publicity and political publicity. The party Ataka started out as a media party. It is no coincidence that the name of the party and the name of the newspaper were assumed from Siderov’s TV program on SKAT. Since the changes in 1989 SKAT is the only TV station which has a party in this way.” More importantly, Ataka’s use of new media — mainly their website
and online forums — provided Siderov and his political allies with the opportunity to engage directly with disgruntled Bulgarian voters, while at the same time, employing highly inflammatory rhetoric and hate speech, virtually unsanctioned by media regulations or legal consequences.

Siderov’s foremost media forum was his signature show Ataka, which started in 2003 on Skat TV. Skat started operations as a cable operator in the Black Sea region of Bourgas, and soon gained popularity among local subscribers because of its relatively low prices, as well as its emphasis on entertainment shows and discussion forums. What the shows lacked in professional execution, it largely made up in its array of colorful guests and frank verbal (and sometimes physical) exchange of arguments. This is how Siderov became the lead figure of his own show. The show’s nationalistic theme was underscored by its opening, featuring Wagner’s Valkyries and shots from the First Balkan War (Ditchev, 2006). The 15-minute show was loaded with compromising facts about leading political figures, their corrupt practices and “criminal” neglect of domestic and foreign policy. Siderov’s show was just like most of Skat’s productions — a very low cost production, shot in an amateur TV studio against the backdrop of the Bulgarian Customs Authorities at the border with Turkey — a symbolic representation of Siderov’s distrust and open dislike of Bulgaria’s southern neighbor.

In his shows, Siderov uses harsh and often insulting language regarding the Turkish minority. His main thesis, one that has been repeatedly articulated in nationalistic discourse by many sources, claims that the Movement for Rights and Freedoms — a major player on the political scene in the post-communist transition, claiming to represent the interests of Bulgaria’s ethnic minorities — is unconstitutional because of its ethnic membership base, and should be disbanded, while the leader of the movement, Ahmed Dugan, should be expelled from the country because he is a traitor to the Bulgarian national idea. In fact, Ghodshee (2007, p. 35) stated, “Siderov has put many politicians in the uncomfortable position of having to agree with him or seem anti-Bulgarian.” While some of Siderov’s rhetoric is not necessarily new to the political climate in the country (Kanev, 2005), he also took a completely different tone — one openly prompting ethnic hatred and intolerance not only towards the Turkish minority, but also towards the Roma minority as well. As Kanev (2005, p. 7) argued, this rhetoric is truly an “equivalent of the Libre des Mille Collines radio and television in Rwanda, from the time leading up to the genocide.”

The nationalistic discourse reached its pinnacle during the 2005 parliamentary and 2006 presidential campaigns, conducted both through the channels of Skat and Skat+, but also aided by the fueling of nationalistic sentiments among readers of the Ataka newspaper, first published in October of 2005. The circulation of the newspaper is unknown, but its website featured in 2006 a forum which shows more than 296,391 posts on topics concerning Bulgarian politics and social life, and 58,847 posts on topics of international nature. The web edition of the newspaper represents an expanded print version of the TV show and has become a popular venue for
the expression of the views and opinions of the Ataka parliamentary group members, who also link their Facebook profiles to the newspaper’s main page. Selective and biased in its coverage, the online edition chooses to highlight interviews with Siderov, his statements in various media, as well as the news of the day that fit Ataka’s ultra-nationalist agenda.

What is more, the nationalistic discourse, which so successfully morphed political issues with issues of ethnic strife, was Ataka’s trump card in the Bulgaria mediascape. All of Skat’s TV shows, the majority of which have a clear Bulgarian affiliation (were either produced by Bulgarians or are on topics about Bulgaria), allowed the channel to build a strong patriotic identity which fortified Ataka’s nationalism platform. Table 1, for example, displays a typical 24-hour programming schedule for a week day during 2006, which shows the almost exclusive concentration on local productions and talk shows with a political theme, hosted for the most part by members or sympathizers of the Ataka party.

Table 1. Skat TV 24 Hour Programming Schedule (September 9, 2006)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time slot</th>
<th>Program</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>07.00 a.m.</td>
<td>Early News</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.00 a.m.</td>
<td>Psychoanalytical show</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.15 a.m.</td>
<td>Comedic sketches</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.00 a.m.</td>
<td>Bulgarian Folklore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Health-wise with Hristo Deyanov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.10 p.m.</td>
<td>Discussion Studio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.40 p.m.</td>
<td>Love for Bulgaria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.00 p.m.</td>
<td><em>International Folkloric</em> Festival Varna 2006</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.30 p.m.</td>
<td><em>Thoughts and Passions</em> with Prof. Julian Vuchkov (live)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17.30 p.m.</td>
<td><em>Pacifier</em> — Program for New Mothers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.00 p.m.</td>
<td><em>Folk songs</em> medley</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18.15 p.m.</td>
<td>Health-wise with Hristo Deyanov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.00 p.m.</td>
<td>News — Central Evening Newscast</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.20 p.m.</td>
<td><em>Ataka</em> with Volen Siderov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19.30 p.m.</td>
<td>Discussion Studio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20.30 p.m.</td>
<td><em>This Cannot Be True!</em> A commentary by Tsvetan Nachev</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21.30 p.m.</td>
<td><em>Between the Lines</em> — press review with Georgi Ifandiev</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.00 p.m.</td>
<td><em>Ataka</em> with Volen Siderov (repeat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.10 p.m.</td>
<td>News, Weather</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22.30 p.m.</td>
<td><em>Broken Chains</em> — Fight Bulgarian Independence (1908) documentary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time</td>
<td>Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.00 p.m.</td>
<td>Life Predictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23.00 p.m.</td>
<td>Premonitions and Suggestions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00.00 a.m.</td>
<td>Music Festival Emil Chakurov</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00.30 a.m.</td>
<td>News. Weather</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>00.50 a.m.</td>
<td>Ataka with Volen Siderov (repeat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01.00 a.m.</td>
<td>Discussion Studio (repeat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02.00 a.m.</td>
<td>Health-wise with Hristo Deyanov (repeat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02.45 a.m.</td>
<td>At the Artist's Studio Nikola Markov (a cultural program)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>03.10 a.m.</td>
<td>Concert of Palas Band (Bulgarian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04.10 a.m.</td>
<td>Italian Parks (a documentary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>04.30 a.m.</td>
<td>A Feeling of Eternity (a documentary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05.00 a.m.</td>
<td>Percussion Concert</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>05.30 a.m.</td>
<td>Monuments of Culture in Sofia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>06.00 a.m.</td>
<td>Uncompromising A political commentary</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Most of these shows, such as Prof. Vuchkov’s *Thoughts and Passions* as well as *This Cannot Be True*, are categorized as “commentaries,” however, the shows usually feature a host who either invites purposively selected guests, or maintains a phone line, allowing for viewers to call in with comments. Often, these shows openly provoke and encourage the audience to voice nationalistic and inflammatory ideas, some of which clearly resonate with Ataka’s tone of ethnic hatred against Turks and Romas, which sometimes exacerbates into pure “xenophobic propaganda” (Cohen, 2007, p. 10).

In the public sphere and the media world, racist and xenophobic speech is to be monitored by the Committee on Electronic Media (CEM), Bulgaria’s media regulatory body.\(^2\) While the CEM initiated a variety of measures to define hate speech and sanction its use in public discourse, they have also remained largely neutral in aggressively implementing these measures, particularly in the case of Ataka. One particularly blatant example of CEM’s failure to act in sanctioning Ataka’s hate speech is connected to the case of another Bulgarian TV station, Den TV. Den was cited in November 2002 for inciting hate speech in its program *From Telephone to Microphone* and the license of the TV station was revoked in 2003. The program *From Telephone to Microphone* depended on the active participation of viewers, who called in with different, and often, inflammatory remarks on national, political

---

\(^2\) CEM is a board of public figures and media practitioners whose regulatory functions are dictated by the Bulgarian constitution and amendments to the law. Members of CEM are usually political appointments and represent the political forces in power.
and religious issues, similar to the format of the populist shows on Skat TV (IHF Report, 2003). Prior to closing down Den, the CEM issued a fine to the amount of 15,000 BGN ($10,000), a sum that was unprecedented in Bulgarian TV history and by Bulgaria standards (IHF Report, 2003). While the CEM cited provisions of the law that prohibits the dissemination of religious and ethnic enmity, many critics have argued that the demise of Den was a result of returning political favors (Kanev, 2005; Cohen, 2007). Ironically, after the closure of Den, the host of the show which triggered the sanction of the CEM, Nick Stein, a German citizen who has become a mouthpiece of “vulgar and virulent” rhetoric against minorities in Bulgaria, was invited to host a similar show on Skat TV, where his polemics have even intensified in tone and boldness (Kanev, 2005; Cohen, 2007). The fact that Den’s license was later renewed and that Skat has never been sanctioned by the CEM for hate speech or any other violation over its decade-long run in the ether is evident of the short-lived successes of the regulatory body to institute a meaningful and effective regulation that oversees these matters in the case of electronic media.3

In addition to their TV blitz, Ataka managed to create a solid web presence as early as 2005, which has only expanded in recent years to include a version of its web site in Russian and a website featuring their 24-page-newspaper Ataka, a new TV network ALFA featuring video clips from Ataka TV, as well as a plethora of other materials, including user-generated videos and taped speeches given by Siderov. The website has grown both in popularity and technical sophistication, and now features along with Facebook and Twitter links downloadable cell phone ringtones, featuring music used in the Ataka TV show, various propaganda clips, as well as desktop wallpapers and audio and video files, featuring scenes from classic Bulgarian movies that celebrate the glorious past and rich cultural history of the Bulgarian nation.

In addition to maintaining the memories of Bulgarian military might and its regional cultural dominance — memories which Ataka has considered to be largely ignored and deliberately neglected by the current political class — Ataka found a particularly savvy use of their web presence during election times. For example, during the parliamentary elections of 2005, in order to further inflate feelings of ethnic intolerance, Ataka’s home page (www.ataka.bg) featured the map of Bulgaria covered with Turkish and Israeli flags fronting a huge “for sale” sign (Tavanier, 2005). These provocative illustrations, pointing to Ataka’s long standing opposition to the influence of foreign forces in Bulgarian politics and business, will normally be considered both anti-Semitic and xenophobic. However, given the fact that the Internet is a censorship-free environment, Ataka’s inflammatory rhetoric’s went virtually unsanctioned and with no consequences for the popularity of the party’s nationalistic platform.

3 It must be noted that the matter of sanctioning hate speech becomes even more complex when it comes to monitoring hate speech on the internet where the regulatory mechanism are even more evasive and difficult to enforce.
Because of this lack of speech regulatory oversight in cyber-space, Ataka has continued to use the virtual reality of their Internet presence as the forum where their “patriotic” tendencies run amok. During the 2007 elections for the European Parliament, Ataka engaged in a provocative election campaign, featuring a number of video clips and posters, in which a variety of improbable historic scenarios were depicted. The campaign message centered on the idea that had it not been for Bulgarian resistance to the Ottoman invasion, the European continent would have been completely subjugated by the Muslim Empire. To further illustrate this premise, the campaign featured posters in which famous European cultural landmarks, such as the Eiffel Tower in Paris, are converted into minarets of Islamic mosques. Similarly, the overdramatic video clip featured European capital cities, engulfed in flames, painting the scenario of what would have happened to western Europe if Bulgaria did not stand up to the Ottomans. The video clip played several times on Bulgarian television and drew intense criticism by human rights activists and members of the Council of Electronic Media, because of its potential to incite hate speech and ethnic intolerance. Eventually, Ataka was asked to remove the video message from circulation in the mainstream media. However, Ataka continued to feature the video material on their website, despite threats of sanctions and legal consequences. In fact, the video clip remains available for download from the party’s website even to this day and can be streamed for broadcast on a variety of handheld devices, including personal computers and cell phones.

The media strategies that Ataka crafted were particularly instructive to other nationalistic political formations, which in turn, aspired to become legitimate players on the Bulgarian political scene. Among those political novices, the Bulgarian Nationalistic Union (BNU) was quick to follow the same path in disseminating its right wing ideology in cyberspace. The Union, established by a group of hard-line nationalists, led by Boyan Rasate — a popular ultra-nationalist public persona turned politician, who hosts his own show on one of Bulgaria’s TV channels (BBT, which initially was the Bulgarian Military Channel, eventually transformed into a nationwide and independent commercial station) also appears as a frequent guest and commentator on a number of other TV shows — is implicitly related to the WWII Bulgarian National Legions organization, which was openly sympathetic to Adolf Hitler and represented the youth fascist formation in Bulgaria. The connections between the BNU and neo-Nazi ideologies become evident not only in their rhetoric and symbolic representations — the party’s TV appearances often feature slogans and musical themes resembling the ideologies and practices of Nazi Germany — but are also prominently featured in their web presence, where we see a variety of interactive digital materials, including video materials featuring training sessions of members of the youth legions of the party, who wear uniforms similar to those of the fascist youth organization in WWII Bulgaria, further establishing the extreme nature of the xenophobic slogans that BNU espouses. In fact, the websites feature deliberately selected historic documents, emphasizing the glorious past of...
Bulgaria, and in particular stressing the military victories of the Bulgarian army in the Balkan Wars, WWI and WWII, as well as user-generated materials, featuring famous Bulgarian historical figures, widely seen as tokens of the liberation movement for independent Bulgaria. The BNU website is certainly rich — in addition to news materials and active input from various local branches of the organization, there are also a number of links to video materials, featuring the BNU’s leaders’ TV appearances, forum presentations and public debates as well as a very active online forum, which congregates discussions on topics of national importance that hyperlinks to Ataka’s as well as all other nationalistic forums. These forums require registration but are not moderated and frequently highlight diatribes and angry rants against minorities in Bulgaria, the foreign presence and their political influence in Bulgarian politics as well as the gay and lesbian population.

It becomes evident that electronic media has afforded the far-right movement in Bulgaria new and unprecedented means of organizing their base and propagandizing their ideological platform. A notable example is the BNU’s website, which was specifically launched to commemorate the political idol of the movement, general Hristo Lukov, and organize a national march in his honor on the date marking his assassination by Violeta Yakova, a Jewish communist woman who was later murdered by fascists seeking revenge for their leader’s death. Launched as a cyber-headquarters central of the organizing effort to mobilize the so-called “Lukovmarch,” the website features an impressive array of links and materials, including imbedded video materials, posted also on YouTube, showing how to be a BNU activist. The website also instructs users how to place graffiti and distribute posters, leaflets and postcards, as well as how to connect to other activists using social networking sites, such as Facebook and Twitter.

CONCLUSION

Historically, the media have played an essential part in the imagination of national communities, and the creation of a national culture and national identity would have been impossible without the contribution of print and broadcast media. The widespread dissemination of newspapers and novels led to an awareness of the “steady, anonymous, simultaneous experience” of communities of national readers (Anderson, 1983, p. 31). As Schlesinger (1991, p. 131) noted, the question of the relationship of the media to national cultural identity received “an easy and obvious answer: the media must be important because they are so prevalent.”

Although the link between media, social order and political culture has been a common theme in critical studies to the media, this link has not been thoroughly explored in the literature on the discursive production of nationalism, and particularly so in the condition of the growing popularity of new technologies and means of communication. In addition, taking the discussion on nationalism and the media to the region of the Balkans is important considering the virulent, omnipotent and incredibly
explosive versions of nationalism that have plagued the region for centuries and continued to be a leading cause for political tension among neighboring nation states.

Despite its relatively peaceful approach to dissolving ethnic tensions between the diverse ethnicities constituting the Bulgarian nation, the Bulgarian political space has recently witnessed a plethora of ethnically and racially charged discourses. These discourses, while clearly motivated by the political ambitions of future parliamentarians and presidential candidates, have also changed the nature of ethnic and cultural dialogue in the public sphere of the post-communist transition. In the case of the Bulgarian ultra-nationalist party Ataka, the expression of national identity came not only through a rejection of all things foreign, but was also expressed in the rejection of “the establishment,” anti-Bulgarian media, which was seen as too elite-driven and removed from the reality of the common Bulgarian voter. Even though the current political sway of the Ataka party has somewhat dwindled down — some of Ataka’s clout has been significantly hurt, partially because of Siderov’s sanctimonious leadership style and combustive personality — its approach to establishing a niche media, untouched by the “hand” of the censors and unguided by an ethics code, journalistic norms or social responsibility, has set a strong example and has inspired other nationalistic political formations, many with much more extreme ideologies and political views, like BNU, to turn to new media in their search for legitimacy, support and easy access to the Bulgarian voter. In response to what Ataka saw as corrupt and unpatriotic media institutions, Ataka created its own alternatives, “television for Bulgarians by Bulgarians,” a newspaper with a true Bulgarian identity, and a web presence that served as an unfettered arena for disseminating far-right, hateful and inflammatory rhetoric. Perhaps even more dangerous has been the failure of the established political class and the mainstream media to recognize the popularity and the media savvy approach of nationalistic groups. In fact, both Skat TV and the Ataka newspaper were initially dismissed by the major political forces as weak attempts to win populist votes among the Bulgarian electorate. However, they have proven to be an instant success with a largely disfranchised public and enjoy continued support while generating further growing interest among their followers. As Angelova (2006, p. 11) pointed out, “even if we find a social, economic or political reason for the birth of Ataka, Ataka’s use of the media remains unique and phenomenal in its success.”

Recent political developments in Western and Eastern Europe, characterized by the successes of neo-conservative and right-wing populist parties, while clearly accentuating the symbolic identity constructions of nation and promoting ethnic division, point to the importance of cultural and national identity as representing the collective memory of the nation. In Eastern Europe, however, the popularity of right-wing ideologies has also been directly connected to the economic woes and political instability of the post-communist transition. In the context of these circumstances, to paraphrase the noted Bulgarian historian Andrey Pantev, the more a nation has a miserable present, the more it tends to glorify its past. On the other hand, one of the fastest paths to glorifying the past in an easily accessible and engaging way is
what Billig (1995) called “banal nationalism,” which more or less encompasses the customary “us vs. them” divisions ingrained in people’s habits of speech, the never-questioned and ever-communicated beliefs about the glory of a nation’s past that reproduces national identity at the level of people’s discursive experience: “[…] an identity is to be found in the embodied habits of social life. Such habits include those of thinking and using language. To have a national identity is to possess ways of talking about nationhood.” (p. 8). Similarly, a new wave of insurgent nationalism is also taking place, facilitated by new media tools, including social networks such as Facebook and has a very strong following among the younger population segment of Eastern Europe. This trend was documented by Vladimir Milovanovic, a Serbian activist, who has followed the growing popularity of “Facebook nationalism” among Serbian youth — a trend he also described as “emotional nationalism” (Facebook Wars, 2010). Milanovic noted that the appeal of this type of free-ranging nationalist rhetoric is particularly potent and often serves as a catalyst for inciting ethnic intolerance, even among youth who won’t usually describe themselves as particularly nationalistic. He called this trend “civic fascism,” where “people who stand for liberal ideas are compelled to engage in discussions with people with different political opinions in a banal and vulgar way. The ideology is not crucial here. There is aggression, anger, and discontent on all sides” (p. 2). Today, with the ease of access to online media and digital content, talking about nationhood has become a conversation that takes place virtually unmediated in cyber-space, with a discursive power and ideological potential which needs to be at a minimum acknowledged, if not duly recognized, for its potential to ignite intolerance and inflame ethnic strife.

REFERENCES

Elza Ibrošcheva


